📝 TXT Lookup

See every TXT record a hostname publishes — SPF, DMARC, domain verification strings, and anything else stored there — from a live DNS query.

Examples: google.com   github.com   _dmarc.google.com
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A domain's TXT records are its junk drawer, in the best sense — a place to publish short, arbitrary text strings that don't fit any other DNS record type, and over the years that drawer has ended up holding some genuinely load-bearing infrastructure. Email authentication policy, domain ownership proof, third-party service configuration — all of it routinely lives in TXT records, invisible unless you specifically go looking. This page queries them live, and below it is a complete reference on what TXT records are, how the major email-authentication and verification systems actually use them, and where they cause real trouble.
⭐ ToolsNovaHub Pro Tip
When debugging "email going to spam," check the domain's TXT records before touching anything else — a missing or malformed SPF record, or a DMARC policy set stricter than the sending infrastructure actually supports, causes more delivery problems than almost anything else in the stack.
⚠️ Common Beginner Mistake
Publishing two separate SPF TXT records at the same name instead of merging them into one. DNS explicitly forbids multiple SPF records for a single domain — resolvers that find more than one are required to treat SPF as failed entirely, which is the opposite of what anyone adding a second record intended.

🔍 What Is a TXT Record?

A TXT record stores a piece of arbitrary text at a DNS name — nothing more structurally specific than that. Unlike an A record, which must hold a valid IPv4 address, or an MX record, which must reference a mail server hostname with a priority, a TXT record's value is just a string, and it's up to whatever's reading it to decide what that string means. That flexibility is exactly why TXT records ended up hosting so much unrelated infrastructure over the years: email authentication systems, domain-ownership verification, third-party integration tokens, and more, all reusing the same generic text-storage mechanism rather than each inventing a dedicated record type.

This tool exists because that flexibility also makes TXT records genuinely easy to misconfigure — a single typo in an SPF string, a duplicate record where there should be one, a verification string added to the wrong subdomain — and checking exactly what's published, right now, is often the fastest way to confirm or rule out a DNS-level cause during troubleshooting.

📋 Record Structure & Syntax

A TXT record's zone-file structure is minimal: a name, a TTL, a class, the record type, and the text value itself, wrapped in quotes:

example.com.    3600    IN    TXT    "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

Individual TXT record values are limited to 255 characters per quoted string at the protocol level, though DNS allows multiple quoted strings to be concatenated within a single TXT record for longer content — most consuming applications treat that concatenation transparently, but it's worth knowing about if a long value looks unexpectedly split when viewed in a raw zone file.

⚙️ How This Tool Queries TXT Records

When you click Lookup, the tool sends a live query for the TXT record type against a public DNS resolver and returns exactly what's currently published — not a cached snapshot. Every TXT record at that name is returned together, since a single hostname routinely holds several at once.

1

You Enter a Hostname

Type in the domain, subdomain, or special name (like _dmarc.example.com) you want to check.

2

A Live TXT Query Is Sent

The tool queries a public DNS-over-HTTPS resolver directly for the TXT record type.

3

Every Record Is Parsed

All TXT values at that name are extracted, and common patterns like SPF are automatically tagged for readability.

4

Results Are Displayed

Values, TTLs, and detected types are shown in a readable table, alongside the raw resolver response.

📧 Email Authentication: SPF, DKIM & DMARC

Three of the most operationally important TXT records in existence exist purely to fight email spoofing, and all three reuse the generic TXT mechanism rather than having their own dedicated record type:

SPF (Sender Policy Framework) lists which mail servers are authorized to send email on a domain's behalf, published as a TXT record starting with v=spf1. Receiving mail servers check the sending server's IP against this list to help decide whether a message is legitimate.

DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) publishes a public cryptographic key as a TXT record at a selector-specific subdomain (like selector._domainkey.example.com), letting receiving servers verify a cryptographic signature attached to outbound mail, confirming the message wasn't altered in transit and genuinely originated from an authorized sender.

DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance) is published as a TXT record at _dmarc.example.com, and it tells receiving servers what to do when a message fails SPF or DKIM checks — quarantine it, reject it outright, or simply monitor and report on failures without taking action yet.

✅ Domain Ownership Verification

Beyond email, TXT records are the dominant method services use to confirm domain ownership before enabling a feature — connecting a custom domain, verifying a site in a search console, or activating a third-party integration. The logic is simple and effective: the service generates a unique string and asks you to publish it as a TXT record; since only someone with actual DNS management access could do that, successfully detecting the string proves control of the domain without requiring any other access or credentials.

📋 Multiple TXT Records at One Name

Unlike a CNAME, a TXT record has no coexistence restriction — a single name routinely holds several simultaneously: an SPF record, one or more verification strings from different services, and potentially others, all coexisting peacefully at the same hostname. The one major exception is SPF specifically: DNS rules require exactly one SPF-formatted TXT record per name, and multiple SPF records at the same name causes SPF evaluation to fail entirely for that domain, by design.

📋 Comparison Tables

Record TypeTypical UseCoexistence Rule
TXTArbitrary text — SPF, verification, configurationMultiple allowed (except SPF: exactly one)
CNAMEAliasing one hostname to anotherCannot coexist with any other record
MXMail server routing, with priorityMultiple allowed, prioritized
A / AAAADirect address mappingMultiple allowed, for load distribution

SPF vs DKIM vs DMARC

MechanismWhat It VerifiesPublished Where
SPFWhich servers may send mail for this domainTXT at the domain/subdomain itself
DKIMMessage wasn't altered; sender authorized via signatureTXT at a selector subdomain
DMARCWhat to do when SPF/DKIM fail; reportingTXT at _dmarc.domain

TXT Verification vs HTML File Verification

MethodRequiresTypical Speed
TXT record verificationDNS zone accessFast, but subject to DNS propagation and TTL
HTML/meta-tag file verificationWeb server file or code accessInstant once uploaded, no DNS wait

🌐 Real-World Examples

📧
Business Email Deliverability
Nearly every business sending transactional or marketing email relies on correctly published SPF, DKIM, and DMARC TXT records to avoid landing in spam.
Search Console Verification
Site owners commonly verify domain ownership in a search or analytics console using a provided TXT verification string.
🏢
Enterprise SaaS Integrations
Enterprises connecting a custom domain to a SaaS platform frequently need a specific TXT record added before the platform will activate the domain.
☁️
Cloud Provider Domain Claims
Cloud platforms commonly use TXT-based verification before allowing a customer to attach a custom domain to a hosted resource.
💻
Developer API Keys via DNS
Some developer platforms issue a DNS-based API key or scope token as a TXT record, avoiding the need for a separate credential file entirely.
🔐
CAA-Adjacent Policy Publishing
Some organizations publish auxiliary security policy text via TXT records alongside dedicated record types like CAA, for tooling that reads both.

🛡️ TXT Support Across DNS Providers

Every major managed DNS provider — Cloudflare, AWS Route 53, Google Cloud DNS, Azure DNS, and registrar panels — supports TXT records natively, with an identical add-record workflow to any other type: select TXT, enter the name, paste the value. Where providers differ slightly is value-length handling — some automatically split long values into multiple quoted strings behind the scenes, others require you to do that manually — worth checking if a very long DKIM key ever gets rejected or truncated unexpectedly.

🖥️ Command-Line Reference

PlatformCommand
Linux / macOS (dig)dig TXT example.com +short
Linux / macOS (host)host -t TXT example.com
Windows (nslookup)nslookup -type=TXT example.com
Windows (PowerShell)Resolve-DnsName -Type TXT example.com
Check DMARC specificallydig TXT _dmarc.example.com +short

⏳ Caching & TTL

TXT records cache the same way any other DNS record does — resolvers honor the TTL and continue serving a previously fetched value until it expires. This matters most for verification workflows: adding a TXT record and immediately re-checking from a resolver that already cached a "not found" answer for that name can show a false negative for a short window, entirely explained by caching rather than anything wrong with the record itself.

🔒 Security Considerations

Because TXT records are so often used for authentication and verification, misconfiguration has outsized consequences compared to most other record types. A DMARC policy set to "reject" before SPF and DKIM are both fully validated and reliable can cause legitimate mail to bounce. An overly permissive SPF record (or one that includes far more third-party senders than actually needed) widens the pool of infrastructure that can plausibly send mail as your domain. And stale verification TXT records left behind after decommissioning a service are, at minimum, unnecessary attack-surface clutter worth periodically cleaning up.

❌ Common Mistakes

⚠️ Publishing two separate SPF TXT records
DNS requires exactly one SPF record per name — a second one causes SPF to fail entirely rather than merging the two.
⚠️ Setting DMARC to reject before testing with monitor mode
Start with p=none to observe reports before tightening to quarantine or reject — jumping straight to reject risks legitimate mail loss.
⚠️ Leaving old verification TXT records in place indefinitely
Unnecessary clutter at best, and a minor information-disclosure risk about which third-party services a domain has used.
⚠️ Assuming a newly added TXT record is instantly visible everywhere
Standard DNS caching applies — a resolver that already cached a negative answer needs its TTL to expire before seeing the new record.

✅ Best Practices

Keep exactly one SPF record per domain, using include mechanisms to combine multiple sending services rather than adding separate records. Roll out DMARC gradually — monitor, then quarantine, then reject — rather than jumping straight to the strictest policy. Periodically audit TXT records for stale verification strings tied to decommissioned services, and always verify a new record with a live lookup before assuming a verification workflow will succeed.

📊 Pros & Cons of TXT-Based Configuration

ProsCons
Universally supported, no special DNS record type neededNo inherent structure — easy to malform a value
Proves domain control without extra credentialsSPF specifically requires exactly one record, easy to violate accidentally
Flexible enough to support many unrelated use casesLong values (like DKIM keys) can hit provider-specific length quirks
Subject to standard DNS caching, same as any recordMisconfiguration in auth-related TXT records has outsized real-world impact

🔧 Troubleshooting

⚠️ Email failing SPF checks unexpectedly
Confirm there's exactly one SPF record, and that every legitimate sending service is actually included in it.
⚠️ Domain verification not detected after adding the TXT record
Confirm the record was added at the exact name requested, and allow time for any previous cached answer's TTL to expire.
⚠️ DMARC reports show unexpected failures
Check whether every legitimate sending source is properly covered by SPF and/or DKIM before tightening the DMARC policy further.
⚠️ A DKIM TXT record looks truncated
Very long keys sometimes need to be manually split across multiple quoted strings depending on your DNS provider — check their specific guidance.

📚 Glossary

TermMeaning
SPFSender Policy Framework — lists authorized mail-sending servers for a domain
DKIMDomainKeys Identified Mail — cryptographic signature verification for outbound mail
DMARCPolicy telling receivers what to do when SPF/DKIM checks fail
SelectorThe subdomain prefix identifying a specific DKIM key (e.g. selector._domainkey)
Verification stringA unique TXT value a service asks you to publish to prove domain ownership

🎓 Expert Tips

🎓
Check TXT Records First for Email Issues
A huge share of "email not delivering" tickets resolve at the TXT-record layer — check SPF, DKIM, and DMARC before investigating anything further downstream.
🔐
Never Skip DMARC's Monitor Phase
Start every DMARC rollout at p=none, review the aggregate reports for a real sending cycle, and only then tighten the policy — skipping this step routinely causes legitimate mail loss.
🔧
Audit for Stale Verification Records Regularly
Make TXT record auditing a recurring task alongside general DNS hygiene — old verification strings from decommissioned services rarely get cleaned up on their own.

For the complete record picture beyond TXT, use DNS Lookup. Check mail routing directly with MX Lookup, or dig deeper into email authentication specifically with SPF Lookup and DKIM Lookup. To confirm whether a DNS change has propagated globally, use DNS Propagation Checker, and to trace an alias chain, try CNAME Lookup.

📚 Want the full picture on this record type? Read: TXT Records → · Verifying a domain with Google or Microsoft? Google Verification →

ToolsNovaHub tools are built and independently maintained with a focus on accurate, no-signup network and security utilities. Spotted an error? Let us know.

📋 Related Tools & Guides Comparison

ResourceTypeLink
MX LookupNetworkOpen Tool →
SPF LookupNetworkOpen Tool →
DKIM LookupNetworkOpen Tool →
TXT RecordsGuideRead Guide →
TXT Record SecurityGuideRead Guide →

FAQ

A TXT record stores arbitrary text at a DNS name. It's used for domain ownership verification, email authentication policies like SPF and DMARC, and other machine-readable configuration data.
Yes. A single name commonly holds several TXT records at once — one for SPF, one for a verification string, one for DMARC policy at the _dmarc subdomain, and so on.
Yes. SPF has no dedicated DNS record type of its own — it's published as a specially formatted TXT record starting with v=spf1.
Adding a specific TXT record proves you control a domain's DNS zone, since only someone with DNS access could publish it — this is the most common ownership-verification method used today.
Live — every lookup queries a public DNS resolver at the moment you click Lookup, reflecting whatever is currently published.
No — DNS requires exactly one SPF record per name. Use include mechanisms within that single record to combine multiple sending sources.
Monitor mode — it collects reports on SPF/DKIM failures without taking action, letting you validate coverage before tightening to quarantine or reject.
TXT values are limited to 255 characters per quoted string at the protocol level; longer values like DKIM keys are split into multiple strings that get concatenated.
At _dmarc.yourdomain.com, as a TXT record — a distinct subdomain from where SPF is typically published.
Standard DNS caching applies — a resolver that already cached a "not found" answer for that name needs the previous TTL to expire before seeing the new record.
Yes — completely free, no signup, unlimited queries. Results come from a public DNS resolver and appear instantly.
Yes — enter any hostname, including special names like _dmarc.example.com or a selector._domainkey subdomain for DKIM.
SPF lists which servers may send mail for a domain; DKIM verifies a cryptographic signature proving a message wasn't altered and came from an authorized sender. They check different things.
Yes, once the associated service is decommissioned — stale verification strings are unnecessary clutter and minor information-disclosure risk.
No, unlike CNAME — TXT records freely coexist with other record types and with each other, with the single exception of SPF requiring exactly one record.